The presented TEM-model describes the economical interaction between several actors (players) which intend to minimize their emissions (E i ) caused by technologies (T i ) by means of expenditures of money (M i ) or nancial means, respectively. The index stands for the i-th player, i = 1; : : :; n. The players are linked by technical cooperations and the market, which expresses itself in the nonlinear time-discrete dynamics of the Technology-Emissions-Means-model, in short: TEMmodel. In the sense of environmental protection, the aim is to reach a state which is mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol by choosing the control parameters such that the emissions of each player become minimized. The focal point is the realization of the necessary optimal control parameters via a played cost game, which is determined by the way of cooperation of the actors. In application to the work of Leitmann, but not regarding solution sets as feasible sets, the -value of Tijs 13] is taken as a control parameter. This leads to a new class of problems in the area of 1-convex games. We want to solve the problem for a special case. With this solution a reasonable model for a Joint-Implementation process is developed, where its necessary fund is represented by the non-empty core of the analyzed game. Steering with parameters of this feasible set, the TEM-model can be regarded as a useful tool to implement and verify a technical Joint-Implementation Program. For the necessary data is given to the Clearing House, we are able to compare the numerical results with real world phenomena.
Introduction -The Kyoto Protocol
The conferences of Rio de Janeiro 1992 and Kyoto 1997 demand for new economic instruments which have a focus on environmental protection in the macro and micro economy. An important economic tool being part of the Kyoto Protocol in that area is Joint-Implementation. It is an international program being part of the Kyoto Protocol which intends to strenghten international cooperations between enterprises in order to reduce CO 2 -reductions. A sustainable development can only be guaranteed if the instrument is embedded in an optimal energy management. Optimal energy management according to Joint-Implementation means in this context that it must work on a micro level with minimal costs and it should be protected against misuse on a macro level. For that reason, the TEM-Model (Technology-Emissions-Means-Model) was developed 10], giving the possibility to simulate such an extraordinary market situation. The case of cooperative economic behavior including co -funding in joint international projects is as well considered as the mathematical analysis of several trend scenarios. This leads to new results in the area of cooperative time-discrete dynamic games using discrete optimization techniques and exploiting the underlying combinatorial structure. The realization of Joint-Implementation is determined by technical and nancial constraints. In a Joint-Implementation Program the reduced emissions resulting from technical cooperations are registrated at the Clearing House. The associated cost reductions should then be allocated in an optimal way. This approach is as well integrated in the TEM-Model as the possibility to regard the in uence of several cost-allocations on the feasible set of control parameters. In the played cost-game a special solution, namely the ?value 13] which stands for a rational allocation process is examined. The main question is in which situations can the ?value be equivalent to the necessary control-parameters in order to reach the regions, which are mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol. Numerical results are as well shown as a qualitative analysis of the TEM-Model. The results in the area of cooperative dynamic games can lead to new insights in Joint-Implementation and can support an improvement of such an important economical management tool.
The TEM-Model
Technology-Emissions-Means-Model
The presented TEM-model describes the economical interaction between several actors (players) which intend to minimize their emissions (E i ) caused by technologies (T i ) by means of expenditures of money (M i ) or nancial means, respectively. The index stands for the i-th player, i = 1; : : :; n. The players are linked by technical cooperations and the market, which expresses itself in the nonlinear time-discrete dynamics of the Technology-Emissions-Means-model, in short: TEM-model. We want to explain in short in which way can we describe the relationship between nancial means and reduced emissions in a Joint-Implementation Program with the following equations:
E i reduced emissions of actor i in percent M i nancial means of actor i Here, em ij describes the e ect on the emissions of the i-th actor, if the j-th actor invests money. We can say that it expresses how e ective technology cooperations are, which is the central element of a Joint-Implementation Program. Furthermore, we are able to determine the em ij -parameter empirically. In the rst equation the level of the reduced emissions at the t-th time-step depends upon the last value plus a market e ect. This e ect expresses itself in the additive terms which might be negative or positive. In general, E i > 0 implies that the actors have reached yet the demanded value E i = 0 (normalized Kyoto-Level). A value E i < 0 expresses that the emissions are less than the requirements of the treaty. In the second equation we see that for such a situation the nancial means will increase whereas E i > 0 leads to a reduction of M i (t + 1):
The equation contains the logistic functional dependence and the memory parameter ' i which describes the e ect of the preceeding investment of nancial means. The dynamics does not guarantee, that the parameter M i (t) lies in the interval, which can be regarded as a budget for the i-th actor 0 M i (t) M i ; i = 1; : : :; n and t = 0; : : :; N: For that reason we have to add restrictions to the dynamical representation. Then it is easy to show that We have guaranteed that M i (t + 1) increases if E i (t) + ' i E i (t) 0 and decreases if E i (t) + ' i E i (t) 0. Applying the memory parameter ' i we have developed a reasonable model for the money expenditure -emission -interaction, where the in uence of the technologies is integrated in the em-matrix of the system. For an detailed description we might refer to 10] where the reader furthermore may found a detailed analysis of the TEM-model. The solutions of the following equations determine the xed points of the TEM-model:
Regarding the Jakobi-matrix, we can state that the following eigenvalues 1 = : : : = n = 1 n+j = 1 ? j M jÊj j = 1; : : :; n are not attractive.
Numerical example
In the following we will present two numerical examples which will give an intuition of the economical behavior which is given by the TEM-model. Additionally, for some data set, it is possible to observe chaotic behavior in the TEM-model. Even though this data is not relevant for practice, it demonstrates the necessity for a control theoretic approach.
The Control Theory
The numerical examinations underline the necessity of a control theoretic approach which is indicated by an additional control term in the second equation of the TEM-model.
u i (t) control parameter According to the Kyoto Protocol this approach means that each actor invests additional nancial means. There are several possibilities to solve the problem of controllability. At this point, we want to concentrate on the feasible sets and their properties in the area of convex games. For that reason we present only one numerical result which shows that it is possible to steer the system into the xed points. For a detailed description we might refer to 10]. 5 The core as feasible set According to the introduction, optimal energy management in the sense of JointImplementation means that it must work on a micro level with minimal costs and it should be protected against misuse on a macro level. The rst demand is solved by the control theoretic approach. The second subject can be treatened by adding constraints to the feasible set of our control parameters. A candidate might be the construction principle of the core in an cooperative n-person game which is de ned in the following way:
De nition 1 Let The core can be seen as a fund, which is constituted at each time-step by a cofunding process. This approach leads to the Bellmann Functional Equations, which are treatened in 10]. In the next section we will concentrate us on the construction of the underlying game. In application to the work of Leitmann 9] , but not regarding solution sets as feasible sets, the -value of Tijs 13] , which has to lie in the core, is taken in the class of quasibalanced games, as a control parameter. 6 The Cost-Game in the TEM-model If we regard the nonlinear time-discrete dynamics of the TEM-model
considering that E i (t) = E i (t + 1) ? E i (t)
In order to reach steady states, which are determined in 10], an independent institution may in uence the trade relations between the actors. In practice, the imposing of taxes or the giving of incentives means that in the TEMmodel the em-parameter will change. Now, the principle of Joint-Implementation implies that technical cooperation will be bene tted: For K i (t) i M i (t) 0 the di erence between the cooperative and the non-cooperative case is always positive. So we have constructed a reasonable cost-game. Now, the method is that at each time step, this amount is put into a central fund. We determine the core for this set and with the -value, which has to lie in it, we want to steer the system. Such a determined value can be considered as a favourite candidate of a co-funding process at each phase of a Joint-Implementation Program. Evaluation of determinants of environmental protection according to Joint-Implementation should be oriented on that approach. In the next section, we will give a short introduction into the theory of quasibalanced games which guarantees at least that the -value is an element of the core.
Quasibalanced Games
For the convenience of the reader we repeat the relevant material from 3] and 14] without proofs, thus makes our exposition self contained. We assume that the reader is familiar with the terminology of the gap-function, the upper-vector and the concession vector which are introduced The main idea of the proof is to take the -value as a core element. The detailed proof is left to the reader. Using the -value as a control parameter we have to present necessary and sufcient conditions for the -value to belong to the core. In the following we will concentrate upon quasi-balanced games and regard the core as feasible set of our control problem. which gives a su cient and necessity condition that the -value is an element of the core. In order to check (7.1) and (7.2) The results of Tijs and Driessen 13] and 3] of this section have nice properties and their clearness tends to a direct application in the TEM-Model. Nevertheless, our next goal is to sharphen these results in the context of the TEM-Model and the underlying cost-game. The aim is to get a representation for our set of the control parameters which can then be realized by a played cost-game whereas the feasible set is presented by the core. 
with K i (t) = ' iMi (t) (i = 1; : : :; n) and K 2 Pot(N) . In the sequel, we have 
For simplicity of notation, we write: v(!) := v(f1; 2; 3g)(!) v( ) := v(f1; 2g)( ) v( ) := v(f1; 3g)( ) v( ) := v(f2; 3g)( ) Furthermore we will neglect the index t. For the game will be played at each timestep separately, we can procede in that way without loss restriction of generality. We will assume that our game is super-additive. In the following we want to examine for which parameters our game is 1-convex. Let us begin with S = f1; 2; 3g . Then we get v(f1; 2; 3g) ? bṽ( ) =ṽ(f1; 2; 3g) ;
which is precisely the assertion. Now we will turn to the coalition S = f1; 2g . We getṽ(f1; 2; 3g) ? bṽ(f3g) = v(f1; 2; 3g) ? ṽ(f1; 2; 3g) ?ṽ(f1; 2g)], which is again the assertion. Our next concern is to nd a solution of the following system of equations: The solution set can be seen as the feasible set of our control problem where each feasible control vector has to be equivalent to the -value of a played convex game.
In the following we want to characterize this set.
9 A characterization of the feasible set Theorem 8 Let v be the cost game which is de ned in ( 8.1). Assuming that we distinguish the following cases of the nondi erentiable system ( 8.4) of equations. We get then the following solutions. Proof 8 First of all we have to solve the system of equations for each case. Let us make the following distinctions. Under the conditions stated above, we get 1. Assumption: Let the maximum be attained at x Then we have x = u 1 + u 2 + u 3 y = u 1 + 2u 3 z = 2u 3 + u 2 . 2. Assumption: Let the maximum be attained at y
Then we have x = 2u 2 + u 1 y = u 1 + u 2 + u 3 z = 2u 2 + u 3 . 3. Assumption: Let the maximum be attained at z
Then we have x = 2u 1 + u 2 y = 2u 1 + u 3 z = u 1 + u 2 + u 3 .
Under the hypotheses, mentioned above, we have to prove, wether the conditions are valid.
Let us begin with the rst case. According to Theorem 7 it is su cient for 1-convexity, that maxfx; y; zg = minfx + y; y + z; y + zg :
In the following we want to present the proof only for one of the three case-studies. The approach is similar in all the three cases. The other cases are left to the reader. Let us concentrate on the rst case. According to that hypothese we get the constraints u 1 u 3 and u 2 u 3 : (9.3)
In addition to ( 9.1) and ( 9.2) we demand now that x = minfx + y; y + z; z + xg (9.4) Without loss restriction of generality, let us assume that the minimum is attained at y + z . Then we get x = y + z u 1 + u 2 + u 3 = u 1 + 2u 3 + 2u 3 + u 2 ) u 3 = 0 (9.5) 
